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A recent paper on the development of the
internal audit profession worldwide (ACCA,
2014) argued that significant changes in and
around the public sector mean that internal
audit must move forward—just checking the
books is no longer enough. Major financial
crises have shown that auditing should not
only be about accuracy and legitimacy of
financial data, but should also be about the
effectiveness and efficiency of the ‘machinery
of government’ and its capability to deal with
change and improvement. The boundaries of
public audit need to widen to a profession that
proactively contributes to the improvement of
government.
The discipline of auditing is rooted in the
‘classic agency problem’ (Hayne and Salterio,
2014, p. 422). The need for internal control in
complex organizations is generally driven by
two key factors: information asymmetries and
goal conflict among participants (Hayne and
Salterio, 2014). The internal audit function is
directly linked to both factors. Internal auditors
serve as indirect monitoring instruments with
which executives gather information about
processes and activities within their organization
which alleviates their informational
disadvantages. Dampening information
asymmetry is only necessary when agents with
partially diverging interests are expected to
stray away from stipulated paths. Internal
auditing, then, is historically rooted in the
struggle against misconduct and
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misappropriations within organizations. As
Power (1997, p. 24) put it:
The aim is to look for irregularities, or ‘red flags’
that put the auditor on alert to possibilities of
fraud.
Auditors are in a sense a ‘tool of management’,
responsible for providing accurate information
about the state of affairs of the organization.
Power (1997, p. 83) speaks of auditing as a form
of indirect self-observation. This makes auditors
important ‘fact-checkers’ or ‘guardians’ of the
norms in organizations (Van Twist et al., 2013).
However, the discipline has embarked upon
a multi-directional journey away from its
classical areas of application. Auditing has
widened its scope from financial auditing to
newer areas of expertise, such as risk
management (Spira and Page, 2003) and
operational performance (Gendron et al., 2007).
Auditing has also become more ambitious in its
purposes, from providing ‘comfort’ and
‘assurance’ to ‘added value’ (Humphrey et al.,
2007, p. 4), ‘more diversified products’ (Bou-
Raad, 2000, p. 183) and ‘the translation
of…scrutiny into lasting change and
improvement’ (ACCA, 2014, p. 3).
In the academic debate about the evolution
of audit and accountability in the public sector,
two diametrically-opposing frames have
developed, pointing in opposite directions in
terms of the development of the profession.
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We refer to these here (based on their theoretical
grounding/origin) as the ‘deficit’ school and
the ‘excess’ school (Bovens et al., 2008).
Audit deficits versus excess
The first school of thought worries about audit
deficits. The exponents of this school go through
the public sector with a fine tooth-comb, finding
‘holes, ‘gaps’ and ‘deficiencies’ in public
accountability in all kinds of areas. For example,
they consider that public–private organizations,
public interest entities, municipalities, the EU,
other international bodies and policy networks
more generally, are insufficiently accountable
for the performance of their duties. A
commonly-heard mantra in this school is
‘Where were the auditors?’ after crises and
scandals (Clarke et al., 2014). A good example
is Enron in 2001—in the debate that followed
Enron’s collapse it was claimed that the auditors
had lost their objectivity and independence as
a result of their consulting activities (Wallace,
2003). Also, they had lost sight of their moral
compass (Everett and Tremblay, 2014). The
growing organizational complexity, our
network society and hybridization of
organizations leads to gaps in accountability,
according to some (Fisher, 2004). The deficit
school usually seeks to remedy this by means of
further rules and regulations and intensifying
regulatory regimes. Numerous audit and
accountability gaps have been highlighted in
recent years, many of which have been repaired
through additional rules, higher standards and
stricter audits (Behn, 2001; Bovens et al., 2008).
The opposing school of thought worries
about audit and accountability overloads or
even excesses. The exponents (Power, 1997;
Hunt, 2003) of this school point to the increase
in auditors, accountability bodies and
administrative burdens in the public sector
and argue that the accumulation of
accountability arrangements resulted in an
‘accountability regime’ that completely defeats
its purpose (Brennan, 1999). They criticise the
expansion of courts of audits that have evolved
from traditional accountants to ‘evaluators’ in
a much broader context (Pollitt et al., 1999),
and fear that many public bodies, public
professionals and the government will be unable
to shoulder the collective weight of the
administrative processes required to meet the
accountability obligations. According to the
exponents of this school, we are living in an
audit society and an accountability state, which
feeds into unrealistic expectations and drives
ineffective investments in supervision, audit
and accountability arrangements (including
internal audit). Their approach is one of ‘less is
more’ or ‘lean and mean’. They often refer to
the vital importance of trust, which can be
damaged by excessive audits and controls.
Bovens et al. (2008) claim that this school of
thought includes public administrators as well
as scholars who point to a growing
‘accountability dilemma’ (Behn, 2001), or argue
that more accountability does not always mean
better government (Koppell, 2005; Leeuw,
2011). See table 1 for a summary of the two
schools of thought.
In this debate, ACCA has taken the more
modern position (aligned with the ‘overload’
or ‘excess’ school), that auditors attach too
much value to certainties, structures and clarity,
and therefore calls for the formulation of new
perspectives on the nature of audit work in the
modern era, which should include daring to
assess the performance of the policy-makers
and leadership and to challenge their potentially
outdated opinions and ideas. In contrast, the
more traditional position (fed into by the ‘deficit’
school) asserts that auditors are not trained for
such a role, nor will the policy-makers and
leadership leave enough room for this.
Table 1. Deficits versus overloads.
The ‘deficit’ school The ‘overload’ school
Concerns There are audit deficits. There is audit overload.
Observations Wrongdoings, abuses, scandals, out-of-control Administrative burden, red-tape, beleaguered
organizations. professionals, suffocating bureaucracy.
Explanations Increasing complexity and fragmentation of Increasing size of the ‘audit pillar’ and its increasing
decision-making, standards, management, impact in terms of time, choices and resources in
supervision and implementation in the the age of the ‘audit explosion’.
‘age of governance’.
Considerations The purpose of auditing is to limit undesirable The purpose of auditing is to encourage learning
behaviour by ‘delegated policy implementers’. and effective behaviour by ‘professional policy implementers’.
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Therefore, the sensible approach is for internal
auditors to hold on to the core of their own
professionalism.
The breaking out strategy of professional
development is intuitively appealing. However,
there are also many good arguments for the
opposing strategy. Not adjusting but, instead,
‘holding on’ to the current professional basis,
and being aware of the necessity of a certain
level of institutionalized distrust, so that an
understanding of complexity and dynamics
cannot cross over into showing understanding
for things that are illegitimate. This is the
holding on strategy for the professional
development of internal audit. This strategy
focuses on retaining the classical principles of
the profession, so as to very carefully look for
ways to integrate innovations. Not adjusting to
a complex and dynamic context outside of the
internal audit profession, but holding on to the
foundations, even if there are frictions between
the professional standards and the expectations
and ambitions existing in the contemporary
professional practice. It comes from the
conviction that the profession’s basis is that the
auditor sticks to the standards, maintains a
distance, does not adjust to the developments
in the outside world, and does not show
understanding for the dynamics and
complexities that characterize the practice of
public administration. Not because auditors do
not comprehend what is happening, but
because it is just as important to have
professionals in the public sector who don’t
show understanding but draw lines and make
judgements on the basis of predetermined
standards and don’t accept any margins in
their measurements.
The strategy of holding on leaves some
room for adjusting to a complex and dynamic
‘external’ context, but it is based on retaining
and safeguarding the essence of the profession.
The risk of this strategy is that the opportunity
to link up to the expectations and ambitions
outside of the profession is lost. The ‘breaking
out’ strategy looks for a new essence of the
internal audit profession that better suits the
complexity and dynamics of the contemporary
public sector. The obvious risk is that the
profession will actually lose the characteristics
that set it apart from related professions, such
as controllers and other professions in the
second line of defence.
The existence of those two opposing schools
of thought is potentially difficult for internal
auditors in doing their daily jobs. Internal
auditors are ‘surrounded in the social web by a
range of more or less contradictory discourses’
(Gendron and Spira, 2010, p. 278).
Qualitative research on auditors underscores
this point: the ‘social and normative
environment’ of organizations is not an
external reality but is treated by auditors as
hard and important facts they have to work
with (Radcliffe, 1999, p. 357). The evolution
of internal audit comes with a multiplicity of
roles which has been captured in various
qualitative studies of (internal) auditing
(Morin, 2003). Roussy (2013) identifies two
key roles of the internal auditor. On the one
hand, there is a protector role, subdivided into
two dimensions: a protective shield and keeper
of secrets. And, on the other hand, the internal
auditor also has a role as a helper, supporting
organizational performance and guidance. The
traditional focus on audit as searching for
red flags is slowly being replaced by a focus
on audit as helpful mechanism in stimulating
improvement. Auditors therefore need to
find ways to both signal issues and risks as
well as to provide guidance on quite divergent
sets of governmental tasks (Roussy, 2013).
Research suggests that internal auditors in
government generally eschew the hard choice
between opposing frames and use various
coping strategies in order to serve different
purposes (Schillemans and Van Twist, 2016).
They try to break out while holding on, or
vice versa.
Looking for effective coping strategies
All this puts the debate about breaking out
or holding on into a different perspective:
the critical question is not one of classic
versus modern or conservative versus
progressive but, rather, it is about where we
can find room in the debate to ensure that
the profession retains its basis while also
being able to meet today’s challenges. The
mission for the profession is to properly
weigh up the interests involved in light of
this. We would suggest that this is not
necessarily a matter of choosing one of the
two camps (and the associated contradictory
expectations and ambitions) but, rather, of
looking for coping strategies and
accompanying practices through which the
complex and also changing requirements
can be made manageable. This is highly
relevant for research on and the practice of
management and control in government and
sets an agenda exploring the realities,
opportunities and limits of audit overloads
and deficits, exploring how to break out
while holding on to the traditional core of
the profession.




This article addresses tensions in the
professional practice of internal audit in
government, which are often framed as
dichotomous choices between modernization
and tradition. This authors clarify these tensions
between audit overloads and audit deficit, and
between holding onto the core or breaking out
to new practices, and suggest the perspective of
coping as a way of reconciling various valid
expectations.
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